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Interviewed for a recent news article, Yale Law Professor Akhil Amar, whom I consider an “intellectual godfather” of the National Popular Vote interstate compact (NPV), shared concerns about the legislation inspired by his (and two other law professors’) work more than 20 years ago. One thing he pointed out is that states could try to gain partisan advantage by changing who gets to vote and how many votes they cast. 

He mentioned Demeny voting, where parents cast additional votes on behalf of their minor children, as a way states could boost their share of the national vote count. As I described earlier, even a small Republican state like Utah could probably add at least 200,000 net votes to the GOP presidential ticket’s national total,. More populous states—Alabama, Tennessee, and Texas, for example—could give Republicans a million extra votes or more by adopting Demeny voting.

NPV lobbyists try to dismiss concerns about Demeny voting and other methods for states to increase their influence if the compact takes effect, but their arguments are dubious at best.

One claim is that states would have to change their constitutions to allow Demeny voting, and because that’s difficult it is therefore unlikely. Anyone who watched the speed with which California changed its constitution—roughly two and a half months between legislative passage and voter approval—to permit mid-decade gerrymandering knows this is false.While not every state can act as quickly as California, many can (including Utah) and others would simply take longer. What the back-and-forth fights over redistricting show is that states will act, changing election rules and even their constitutions, in their own interests. Supporters of California’s change say they were simply responding to other states’ partisan acts. Opponents say that the Golden State’s change was itself an illegitimate partisan act. These same dynamics would drive state action if NPV took effect.

Another claim by NPV’s lobbyists is that all this could happen now. This ignores several very simple facts. States where voters tend to favor one party don’t need Demeny voting—it wouldn’t change the outcome and so there is no incentive to make the policy change. More balanced “battleground” states generally have two competitive political parties which makes it difficult for one party to ram through something intended to benefit that party over the other—the reason states engaging in mid-decade redistricting are either very “blue” or very “red.” It’s also worth noting that in a battleground state it probably isn’t clear which party would gain an advantage. Here again, there is little or no incentive to adopting a change like Demeny voting.

This is one more debate where NPV lobbyists seem oblivious to the incentives that drive politics. There is unlikely to be an opportunity or an incentive for a battleground state to adopt Demeny voting, while states with overwhelming Democratic or Republican majorities may have the opportunity but lack any incentive. 

NPV would change all this. The compact was created by activists and funders who share strong partisan views, and nearly all their legislative support comes from their “side.” Whether they like it or not, NPV is partisan. And it would create a powerful incentive for other partisan states to act in their perceived defense. NPV’s lobbyists seem unable to understand the incentives the compact creates, or how eagerly many partisans will act upon them.